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STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE: AN ANALYSIS OF
CURRENT STANDARDS PROMULGATED BY
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT-
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE V. ASSOCIATION
OF WASHINGTON STEVEDORING COS.
This, then, is an assessment of the State . . . tax system and its effect on
interstate commerce in the United States . . . It is the picture of a system
which works badly for both business and the States. It is the picture of a
system in which the States are reaching farther and farther to impose
smaller and smaller liabilities on more and more companies. It is the pic-
ture of a system which calls upon tax administrators to enforce the unen-
forceable, and the taxpayer to comply with the uncompliable. 1
State and local taxation of interstate commerce involves a delicate recon-
ciliation 2 of the legitimate right of statesa to collect taxes from multistate
companies with the rights of those firms to be free from unfair tax im-
positions. 4  Such a delicate balance has shifted in favor of the state as
local tax impositions, applied to an increasingly broad spectrum of so-called
"interstate activities, 5 grow in number, complexity and dollar amount. 6
These diverse tax impositions have become both unreasonably burdensome
to the interstate firm and troublesome for the state to enforce. 7
1. SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R.
REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 598 (1964) [hereinafter cited as WILLIS COMMITTEE
REPORT].
2. See Note, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Multistate Tax Compact: The
Search for a Delicate Uniformity, 11 COLUM. J.L. AND SOC. PROBS. 231 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Delicate Uniformity].
3. Everything said concerning state taxation is equally applicable to local taxation as well.
The reader can rightfully assume that even though the phrase "local taxation" is not mentioned
it is, in fact, intended.
4. Miller, Current Controversies in State and Local Taxation, 33 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAX. 897, 898 (1975). In J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION,
CASES AND MATERIALS (4th Ed. 1978), [hereinafter cited as STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION], the
authors characterized this balancing as a "conflict between the taxing powers and revenue needs
of the States and the requirements of a unified, national economy . I..." ld. at 237.
5. STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, su pra note 4, at 11-12. For a percentage distribution of
state tax collections, see id. at 13.
6. Id. at 11-15. Between 1965 and 1975 State and local general expenditures increased
from $86.6 billion to $266.2 billion-a 200% increase. Id. at 11.
7. For the larger firm, the complexities of multistate tax laws are time-constuming and
irritating and result in an uneconomical way for it to determine the distribution of its tax pay-
ments. For the vast number of small and moderate-sized companies which carry on their busi-
ness across state lines, the system simply has no relation to their ability to cope with it. WILLIS
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 596.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The inherent complexities involving compliance with and enforcement of
such taxes have been exacerbated by a paucity of unifying federal legisla-
tion, 8 inconsistent interpretations of a vague federal jurisdictional standard 9
and a multiplicity of judicial standards applied to the division of interstate
income. 10 Based on such conflicting considerations as the revenue require-
ments of the State, the goal of an unburdened interstate commerce and the
reality that the economy has become a basically sophisticated multistate
national market," a multiplicity of judicial doctrines 12 has evolved, an evolu-
tion described by the business community and commentators alike as in-
adequate, unprincipled and "devoid of concrete judicial rules . ." 13 and the
Court itself as neither "consistent or reconcilable."' 1 4
As a result many of these state rules are disregarded. Non-compliance in filing is rampant in
that most companies "in spite of a legal system in which companies are often required to file
returns in States in which they maintain sales offices, or inventories of goods ... , the typical
interstate company pays income taxes only where it has a factory, an administrative office, or a
warehouse." Id. at 597. Non-compliance is also epidemic in the computation of tax liability
where interstate companies do file. Deviations from the State's methods are common as most
companies use the figures computed for federal income tax figures. Id. Such non-compliance
also occurs in the treatment of various items of income and expenses for the same reason.
In sum, the system, in practice is highly inequitable as non-compliance has become the ac-
cepted norm for interstate companies. Id. Therefore, the burden of non-compliance falls upon
the wholly local company which is required by the system "to pay on its entire taxable income."
Id. at 598. Interstate companies, however, due to complexities and non-compliance avoid their
fair share "of the tax which would be required of them by a more coherent set of rules." Id.
8. The multistate tax compact may moot this criticism. Any legislation unifying the state
impositions, whether federal or not, is a welcome solution. See Delicate Uniformity, supra note
2.
9. For a discussion of this standard see text accompanying notes 49-93 supra.
10. Delicate Uniformity, supra note 2, at 233.
11. Congress has recognized this reality, although it has not acted upon it. In the Hearings
on S. 282, S. 1245, S. 2092 and H.R. 2092 Before the Subcommittee on State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce of the Senate Committee on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1973), the
Chamber of Commerce, that most august and conservative body, actually favored federal legisla-
tion in this area.
Advances in communication and transportation in this country have brought its to a
point where a huge segment of American business is operating in interstate com-
merce.
Id. at 87.
12. Note, Constitutional Law-State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-Commerce Clause
Analysis, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 380, 395-96 (1974). Such tests involve the concepts of "local
incidents," "direct-indirect taxation," "discrimination," "multiple burdens," "doing business,"
"minimum connections" and "apportionment." Such concepts will be discussed infra.
13. Id. at 394.
14. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954). The Court also stated that
little constructive discussion can be found in responsible commentary as to the
grounds on which to rest a state's power to reach extraterritorial transactions or
nonresidents with tax liabilities. Our decisions are not always clear as to the
grounds on which a tax is supported, especially where more than one exists; nor are
all of our pronouncements . . . consistent or reconcilable.
Id. at 344.
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Although commentators have contended that Congress should take the ini-
tiative in resolving the complexities in this area, 15 the Supreme Court ap-
pears determined to create a balance between the competing interests of the
State's revenue needs and the enhancement of an unburdened free flow of
commerce. 16  The analysis employed in several recent decisions, 17 reiter-
ated and synthesized in Department of Revenue v. Association of
Washington Stevedoring Cos., I demonstrates that the Court has finally ar-
rived at consistent and reconcilable standards delineating the Commerce and
Import-Export Clause limitations on state taxing power of interstate com-
merce. 19
This Note will analyze the specific tests set forth in Washington Stevedor-
ing's Commerce Clause and Import-Export Clause analysis with a particular
focus on the scope of protection such tests will provide interstate taxpayers.
The rationale or policy considerations underlying these tests will be
evaluated. Finally, it will be suggested that confusion in the field of state
taxation of interstate commerce can be only partially solved by judicial deci-
sion.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND OF WASHINGTON STEVEDORING
The levy in question was Washington's one percent business and occupa-
tion tax, 20 amended in 197421 to specifically include the stevedores. 22 The
In Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), the Court again recognized that any attempt to
harmonize the many decisions in the area "would neither clarify what has gone before nor guide
the future." Id. at 252.
15. See Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974
Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. REV. 149, 190 n.217 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as The 1974 Term]. See also WILLIS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at
11-14.
16. See Note, Recent Developments in State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady and National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equaliza-
tion, 7 CAP. L. REV. 143, 143 (1977); Comment, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Road-
way Express, the Diminishing Privilege Tax Immunity, and the Movement Toward Uniformity in
Apportionment, 36 U. CHi. L. REV. 186, 204 (1968).
17. Namely, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) and Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
18. 98 S.Ct. 1388 (1978).
19. This thesis was correctly proposed in W. Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme
Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudication?, 75 MICH. L. REV.
1426, 1426-27 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Unified Approach].
20. The tax provisions, codified in typically convoluted fashion, provide:
There is levied and shall be collected from every person a tax for the act or
privilege of engaging in business activities. Such tax shall be measured by the appli-
cation of rates against value of products, gross proceeds of sales, or gross income of
the business, as the case my be.
WASH. REV. CODE § 82.04.220 (1976).
Upon every person engaging within this state in any business activity other than or
in addition to those enumerated in... ; as to such persons the amount of tax on
1978]
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State's first attempt, in 1937, to impose the tax on stevedoring activity was
held by the United States Supreme Court to be a violation of the Commerce
Clause. 23  The stevedoring companies, attempting to retain their exemption
from the tax, sought a declaratory judgment from a Washington Superior
Court that the amendment, Rule 193D, violated both the Commerce and
Import-Export Clauses. The declaratory judgment was granted. 24
Upon direct appeal the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
of the Superior Court 25 on the basis of the Stevedoring Cases 26 and con-
cluded that "It]he United States Supreme Court obviously views stevedoring
as an integrated inseparable part of commerce by sea, and hence absolutely
protected." 2 7  Upon appeal, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the tax. Adhering to the principles set forth in Complete Auto
account of such activities shall be equal to the gross income of the business multi-
plied by the rate of one percent.
WASH. REV. CODE § 82.04.290 (1976).
21. Revised Rule 193, Part D, WASH. ADMIN. CODE 458-20-193 D. Revised Rule 193 D
restored the original scope of the tax. 98 S.Ct. at 1393. The origninal Rule, Rule 198 of the
Rules and Regulations Relating to the Revenue Act of 1935, allowed taxpayers a deduction for
certain income received from interstate and foreign commerce. Income from Stevedoring was
not deductible. However, in Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90
(1937), the United States Supreme Court invalidated the Stevedoring exception, the result
being that income from Stevedoring was to also be deductible. Such a deduction was effective
until the 1974 passage of Revised Rule 193 D. 98 S.Ct. at 1394.
22. The business of Stevedoring as described by the Department of Revenue is as follows:
The Stevedores' contract with ship owners to load or unload vessels through the
Stevedores' own employees, controlling and directing the work themselves. 302
U.S. at 91. Vessels are unloaded by moving the cargo from the ship's hold to the
'first place of rest' on the dock; and are loaded by moving the cargo from the place
of rest on the dock to the ship's hold. . . . More precisely, stevedoring consists of
taking cargo from a place on the pier wholly within the territorial limits of the State
of Washington and . . . 'storing it properly for safety and for handling in or on the
outgoing vessel along side, or of similarly unloading a vessel on its arrival ... . The
vessels and cargo are moving exclusively in foreign or interstate commerce."
Brief for Petitioner at 4, The Dep't of Revenue v. Ass'n of Washington Stevedoring Cos., No.
76-1706 (1976).
23. Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937). See also note
26 infra.
24. 88 Washing. 2d 315, 559 P.2d 997 (1977). The Superior Court, considering itself bound
by the Stevedoring Cases, declared Rule 193D invalid to the extent it related to stevedoring in
interstate or foreign commerce.
25. Id.
26. Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937); Joseph v. Car-
ter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947) [together cited as the Stevedoring Cases].
27. 88 Wash. 2d at 318, 559 P.2d. at 998. Two dissenting justices, however, found no
violation of the Import-Export Clause on the ground that the State had taxed only the activity of
stevedoring, not the goods themselves. They concluded that, even if stevedoring was considered
part of interstate commerce, the tax was valid because it did not discriminate against importing
or exporting, impair transportation, impose multiple burdens, nor regulate commerce. 88 Wash.
2d at 320-322, 559 P.2d, at 999-1000. The dissent, relying on the Complete Auto and Michelin
precedents, correctly considered the Stevedoring Cases overruled. 88 Wash. 2d at 320-322, 559
P.2d at 999-1000. (Utter J., dissenting).
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Transit Inc. v. Brady"8 and Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 29 the Court
concluded that the tax, imposed upon the privilege of conducting interstate
business, is a violation of neither the Commerce or Import-Export Clauses.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS
In upholding the Washington business and occupation tax imposed on the
activity of Stevedoring, the Washington Stevedoring Court reinforced the
rule stated in Complete Auto that under appropriate conditions a state may
directly tax the privilege of conducting interstate business. 3° According to
the Court, the Commerce Clause was not drafted to relieve those engaged
in interstate commerce from a just share of the state tax burden even though
it increases the cost of their doing business. 3'
Applying the policy that interstate commerce should pay its way, 32 the
Washington Stevedoring Court proceeded to dismantle both the holdings
and the underlying principles of the Stevedoring Cases. 33 The earlier
stevedoring tax 34 was invalidated solely because it allegedly burdened the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. The Court considered this ap-
proach no longer viable considering that Complete Auto permitted a State to
tax directly such a privilege. 35
28. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
29. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
30. Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), should be regarded as not only
solving "the perennial problem of the validity of a state tax for the privilege of carrying on,
within a state, certain activities related to a corporation's operation of an interstate business,"
Id. at 274, but as providing as new conceptual framework for the analysis of state taxation of
interstate commerce in general. See Unified Approach, supra note 19, at 1427.
In Complete Auto, Mississippi's levy of a gross receipts tax on the privilege of doing business
within the state was imposed on the activity of transporting motor vehicles manufactured out-
side Mississippi. For purposes of the decision the Court assumed these activities to be interstate
commerce. 420 U.S. at 276 n.4. The Court rejected both the form and philosophy that in-
terstate commerce is absolutely protected from state taxation. Regardless of what form the tax
would take it would still be valid. If a state calls "its tax one on 'net income' or on the 'going
concern value' . . ." it would not be invalidated. Id. at 288. The rule of Spector Motor Service,
which deemed a state tax on the "privilege of doing business" per se unconstitutional as re-
jected. Moreover, the Court stated:
There is no economic consequence that follows necessarily from the use of the par-
ticular words, "privilege of doing business," and a focus on that formalism merely
obscures the question whether the tax produces a forbidden effect.
Id. at 288.
The "forbidden effect" would be present if:
the activity is not sufficiently connected to the State to justify a tax, or that the tax
is not fairly related to benefits provided the taxpayer, or that the tax discriminates
against interstate commerce, or that the tax is not fairly apportioned.
Id. at 287.
31. 430 U.S. at 288 quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254
(1938) and Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975).
32. Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281 (1977).
33. See note 26 supra.
34. See Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937).
35. 98 S.Ct. 1396.
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Secondly, the Court rejected the Stevedoring Cases' contention that a di-
rect privilege tax would "threaten multiple burdens" of interstate taxation.
Characterizing such an argument as "an abstraction", the Court in tautologi-
cal fashion, stated that if a tax is levied only on the services performed
within the state, the tax is, by definition, properly apportioned 36 and multi-
ple burdens 37 cannot occur. 38
The stevedoring companies also attempted to preserve the distinction be-
tween the so-called movement cases, involving taxation on transport, 39 and
the non-movement cases, involving taxation on commerce that does not
move goods. 40 Tax immunity had previously been broader in scope in
movement cases than in non-movement cases. The Court rejected this ar-
gument implying that the distinction itself was no longer meaningful as
Complete Auto, a movement case, involved no immunity at all.
The Court also swept away the spurious dichotomy involving the direct-
indirect taxation distinction. The companies attempted to distinguish the tax
in Complete Auto as permissible "indirect" taxation of interstate commerce
because the activities concerned only involved the intrastate movement of
vehicles from a Mississippi rail head to Mississippi dealers. 4 1  The
Washington tax, contended the companies, was an unconstitutional "direct"
tax upon interstate activity itself.42  The Court discarded the distinction be-
tween direct and indirect taxation of interstate commerce 43 both specifically
on the facts of the case and generally with respect to all Commerce Clause
analyses.44
In rejecting the privilege, multiple burdens, movement and direct-indirect
arguments, the Court signaled its intent to replace these rather vague con-
stitutional constructs with more concrete standards. Instead of the rejected
abstractions, constitutionality under Commerce Clause "depends upon the
36. Id. at 1398 citing Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 288. The Court acknowl-
edged that such a tax is burdensome to an interstate activity but stated that
all tax burdens do not impermissibly impede interstate commerce. The Commerce
Clause balance tips against the tax only when it unfairly burdens commerce by
exacting more than a just share from the interstate activity.
Id. at 1398.
37. 98 S.Ct. 1397.
38. 98 S.Ct. 1397 citing Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 at 288-89, n.15.
39. See, e.g., Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954) (Texas tax
on a National gas pipeline).
40. See, e.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938) (New Mexico
tax on publishing newspapers and magazines).
41. 98 S.Ct. 1398 citing Brief for Respondents at 26-28, The Dep't. of Revenue v. Ass'n of
Washington Stevedoring Cos., No. 76-1706 (1976).
42. Id.
43. 98 S.Ct. 1398. The Court dismissed the Respondent's argument on two factual grounds:
in Complete Auto the Court expressly assumed that the movement of vehicles from the out-of-
state manufacturer to the in-state dealer was an interstate "segment" of activity. Moreover, even
granting that the Stevedoring activity to be interstate commerce, it "'occurs completely within
the State of Washington ..... Id.
44. 98 S.Ct. 1399.
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practical effect of the exaction." 4 5  Interstate commerce, the Court held, is
to bear its fair share of the state tax burden, 46 the determination of which
involves four factors: substantial nexus with the State, fair apportionment,
nondiscrimination against interstate commerce and a fair relation to the serv-
ices provided by the State.4 7
In applying these standards, the Court found no facts to indicate that the
Washington tax obtained more than its fair share. Substantial nexus was
demonstrated by the fact that the companies conduct their entire stevedor-
ing operations within the State. The tax was fairly apportioned as it was
levied solely on the value of the loading and unloading within Washington.
The tax did not discriminate against interstate commerce since the one per-
cent rate applied to virtually all Washington businesses rendering services.
Finally, the Court, in a rather conclusory and ephemeral manner, found
"nothing in the record [to suggest] that the tax is not fairly related to serv-
ices and protection provided by the State." 4 8
Other than this cursory application to the specific facts, the Court did not
further delineate the boundaries of these standards. Therefore a detailed his-
torical analysis of the scope and underlying policy considerations of the four
Commerce Clause factors applied in Washington Stevedoring is necessary if
interstate taxpayers are to be properly appraised of their potential liability
for or protection from inevitably increasing state and local impositions.
Substantial Nexus and Fair Relation to
Services Provided: The Due Process Limitations
In Washington Stevedoring, the Court reiterated the principle that a tax
will be sustained so long as the activity to be taxed has a substantial nexus 49
with the State. 50  This nexus requirement 51 is the threshold precondition
52
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 98 S.Ct. 1400.
49. The economic and qualitative analysis offered by the Court to sustain nexus would also
apply to the fourth requirement of Washington Stevedoring: fair relation to the services. If a
proper nexus is shown it would seem logically impossible to show that the tax is not fairly
related to the services provided by the state.
50. 98 S.Ct. 1399.
51. See The 1974 Term, supra note 15, at 161. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in General
Motors Corp. v. Washington 377 U.S. 436, 449-50 (1964), framed the issue in this manner:
In order to tax any transaction, the Due Process Clause requires that a State
show a sufficient "nexus between such a tax and transaction within a state for which
the tax is an exaction."
377 U.S. at 449-50.
THE WILLIS COMMITTEE REPORT, critically but accurately, described the issue:
In determining tax liability, the threshold question for every business which
crosses State lines is that of jurisdiction. Is the company required to file a return in
the State? The jurisdictional provisions of most State tax laws do very little to help the
somewhat reluctant bride across the threshold. Phrases such as "doing business"
1978]
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on a state's power to tax. However, the parameters of this jurisdictional con-
nection have long perplexed the taxing authorities, taxpayers and commen-
tators alike.
53
A precise definition of what activities constitute sufficient nexus in the
constitutional sense is still lacking. The Congressional attempt to define
"nexus", is framed in language stating "what is not, rather than what is, a
sufficient nexus." 54  The Congressional definition provides in part:
No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have the power to im-
pose ... a net income tax on income derived within such State . . .by
any person from interstate commerce if the only business activities within
such State by or on behalf of such person during such taxable years are
either, or both, of the following:
(1) The solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in
such State for sales of tangible personal property which orders are sent
outside the State for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by
shipment or delivery from a point outside the State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in
such State in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of
such person, if orders by such customer to such person to enable such
customer to fill orders resulting from such solicitation are orders described
in paragraph (1).55
Framed in exclusionary language, this jurisdictional standard results in a
broad interpretation of nexus, 56 in that many activities are ruled to be more
than mere solicitation because they do not fall exactly within the federal
definition. 57  Consequently, prediction of tax liability is as difficult now as it
was prior to the enactment of federal legislation. 58
and "deriving income" are construed by various administrators to produce different
results where the company has anything less than a factory, administrative office, or
warehouse in the State; . . . In some states the company which has its salesmen
make collections and investigate credit becomes liable to file an income tax return,
while in other states it has no liability even though its activities are more extensive.
In some States a company is liable because it employs a telephone answering serv-
ice in conjunction with the solicitation of orders by its salesman, while in other
states it has no liability even though it maintains a full-fledged sales office in the
State.
WILLIS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 594.
52. WILLIS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 594. One commentator raised the in-
teresting possibility that the nexus question is actually a disguised apportionment question. Id.
at 162. However, the Washington Stevedoring test, separating the nexus and fair apportionment
elements, would indicate that such a distinction is more than illusory. We are assuming, there-
fore, that before the issue of fair apportionment can be resolved, the threshold jurisdictional
requirement must be satisfied.
53. See The 1974 Term, supra note 15, at 161-67.
54. Delicate Uniformity, supra note 2, at 233.
55. Pub. L. No. 86-272, 15 U.S.C. § 381, 73 Stat. 555 (1959), in which Congress has de-
clared that the mere solicitation of orders in a State by a business which accepts, offers and
ships goods from outside the state is not enough to provide the jurisdictional nexus.
56. WILLIS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 595.
57. Id. at 594.
58. Id.
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Confronted by the lack of a meaningful federal jurisdictional standard,
both before and after passage of federal legislation, the Supreme Court de-
veloped its own mechanism "for determining whether state tax power has
been exerted solely over receipts that arise from the taxpayer's activities
within the taxing State." 59 The mechanism involved was the nexus re-
quirement, which in reality is a composite of tests fashioned over a period of
25 years.
The seminal decision involving jurisdictional nexus is considered to be
Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 60 which involved an Illinois Occupa-
tion Tax, imposed on the gross receipts of those persons engaged in the
business of selling tangible personal property at retail. 61 Local over-the-
counter sales were acknowledged by the company to be constitutionally tax-
able. However, the company contended that its other sales were specifically
exempt as interstate commerce. 6 2 The Court found that the company's en-
trance into the state to do local business was a sufficient "local incident" to
bring the transaction within the state's taxing power.6 3  Presuming all sales
to be local, the Court stated that "only by showing that particular trans-
actions are dissociated from the local business and [are] interstate in nature
... can the taxpayer avoid the tax.6 4 According to the Court, the taxpayer
failed to meet this burden of showing that the particular transactions were
dissociated in that it had "not established that [the] services as were ren-
dered by the [local] office were not decisive factors in establishing and hold-
ing this market." 65
The specific economic criteria of Norton was again used in General Motors
v. Washington 66-but was given a much broader interpretation. The tax in
question, Washington's business and occupation tax, was applied to an out of
state wholesaler and measured, as in Norton, by unapportioned gross re-
ceipts derived from sales of motor vehicles parts delivered in the state. Gen-
eral Motors contended that the power to tax receipts of sales of items deliv-
ered to the state from out-of-state locations was a violation of due process. 6 7
59. Id. at 162.
60. 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
61. The manufacturer, a Massachusetts corporation, under consent of Illinois, operated a
branch office and warehouse in Chicago from which retail sales were made. The Illinois tax fell
upon the gross receipts of all Norton's sales to Illinois customers including (i) sales based on
orders or shipments which at some point utilized the Chicago outlet; (ii) sales based on orders
from Illinois sent directly to Massachusetts and filled by direct shipment to the Illinois cus-
tomer; and (iii) sales over the counter. 340 U.S. at 536.
62. Id. at 535.
63. Id. at 537.
64. id.
65. Id. at 538. However, orders filled in Massachusetts and sent by direct shipment to
Illinois customers were held to be "so clearly interstate in character that the State could not
reasonably attribute their proceeds to the local business. ... Id. at 539.
66. 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
67. Id. at 437-38. The taxpayers' activities involved promotional and training work carried
on by its local employees, maintenance of a warehouse from which sales were sold to local
1978]
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Embedding its response in a quotation from Norton, the Court found that
General Motors " 'has not established that such services as were rendered
...[through in-state activity] were not decisive factors in establishing and
holding this market.' "6s The corporation could not "channel its operations
through such a maze of local connections .. ."69 and still maintain immunity
to the tax. The "bundle of corporate activity" which General Motors had
engaged in Washington was characterized as "emeshed in local connections
... " and was sufficient to satisfy the nexus requirement. 70
One commentatotr who considered General Motors a retreat from the
"manageable criterion" 71 of Norton, characterized the General Motors test
as a metaphysical substitution. 72  Such a criticism is unwarranted because
the underlying philosophy, the approach used in Washington Stevedoring, is
the same in both instances. In Norton, the sufficiency of the relationship
between local activity and the imposition was measured by whether the
transactions producing the receipts were associated with such activities. 73
Such association was further analyzed in economic terms to mean that the
activities were "decisive factors in establishing and holding [the] market." 74
In General Motors such "association" was also demonstrated by the
economic reality that the in-state company activities were decisive in estab-
lishing and holding the Washington market. Although the language used
may have been "metaphysical", the underlying philosophy was evident
enough: a multi-state company whose activities within a state are economi-
cally significant in establishing and holding that local market evidences suffi-
cient jurisdictional nexus to satisfy due process.
Under this extremely broad interpretation of nexus 75 it is not necessary to
match local activity to interstate revenue on a transaction-by-transaction
dealers, and maintenance of branch "homes" used as offices for the purpose of assisting local
dealers in getting better service.
68. Id. at 448.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 447-48. The General Motors approach led one commentator to poetically assert
that the test
thereby created the possibility that the shapeless criterion of a locally 'enmeshed
bundle of corporate activity' would be used as a rhetorical device to sweep into the
tax collector's grasp all of a taxpayer's gross receipts from sales to instate customers.
The 1974 Term, supra note 15, at 165.
Justice Goldberg, dissenting in General Motors, predicted the same vast result.
[lit is difficult to conceive of a state gross receipts tax on interstate commerce which
could not be sustained under the rationale adopted today. Every interstate sale
invariably involved some local incidents-some 'in-state' activity . . . .The only
coherent pattern that could develop would, in reality, ultimately be based on a
wholly permissive attitude toward state taxation of interstate commerce.
377 U.S. at 456-47 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
71. The 1974 Term, supra note 15, at 165.
72. Id.
73. Norton v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. at 537.
74. Id. at 538.
75. In Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975), the
taxpayer argued that the imposition of the particular levy in question violated "due process
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basis. Instead, the qualitative aspects of local activity are to be disposi-
tive. 76  There need "not be any direct revenue-producing functions within
the State in order for the Court to find a sufficient link between the in-state
activities and the tax imposed." 7 7 Such a "link" was described by the
Washington Stevedoring Court as the state's "significant interest" in exacting
its fair share of the cost of state services. 78  Since the stevedores conducted
their entire operations within Washington, the Court concluded, and logi-
cally so, that the services and protection provided by the state were suffi-
ciently "obvious" 79 to justify nexus, even though such services were not
demonstrated to have been specifically provided for the stevedores.
It appears that the Court has adopted a form of economic analysis, based
on the qualitative nature of the activities being taxed, to determine whether
a sufficient nexus exists. It is not necessary that a direct transaction-by-
transaction quantitative correlation be made between interstate revenues and
the local activities to be taxed. All that need be shown is a minimum con-
nection between the taxpayer and the state. With minor exceptions, 8" such
because the in-state activities were so thin and inconsequential as to make the tax on activities
occurring beyond the borders of the State one which has no reasonable relation to the protec-
tion and benefits conferred by the taxing State .. ." Id. at 562. The Court rephrased this issue
to read: "whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return." Id. quoting Wiscon-
sin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1945).
Characterizing the question as "frivolous," the Court found with almost no analysis that the
company's lone employee within the State helped create and maintain the valuable contractual
relation between the taxpayer and its in-state customer. Id.
76. The 1974 Term, supra note 15, at 167. The State, in fact, asserted that the nature of due
process limitation is qualitative and not quantitative:
These due process requirements are qualitative and not quantitative; .. . While
differing as to detail and quantity. Martinson's in-state activities and that of visiting
personnel are not qualitatively distinguishable from the activities of General Motors
in regard to the wholesale sales at issue ...
77. The 1974 Term, supra note 15, at 166. This approach was further refined in National
Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977), in which nexus,
according to the taxpayer, was asserted to require a relationship between the seller and the
taxing State, and the activity sought to be taxed and the seller's particular activity within the
state. Id. at 560. The Court rejected such a distinction and stated that:
the relevant constitutional test to establish the requisite nexus for requiring an out-
of-state seller to collect and pay the use tax is not whether the duty to collect the
use tax relates to the seller's activities -carried on within the State, but simply
whether the facts demonstrate 'some definite link, some minimum connection, be-
tween [the State and] the person ... it seeks to tax.'
Id. at 561 citing Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954). (emphasis added
by the Court). The Court found that "definite link" in the municipal services and protection
afforded the Society's two offices within the state. Id. at 561. Regardless of the nature of the
activities emanating from those offices-whether they be advertising solicitations or sales-the
same municipal services are provided.
78. 98 S.Ct. at 1398.
79. Id. at 1399.
80. See, e.g., National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758
(1967) (the taxpayer's only communication or contact with customers within the state was by
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minimal connections exist whenever a company takes advantage of the
economic milieu 81 within the state to further its corporate goals. The state
will be entitled to tax the company because the benefits it provides are a
substantial and necessary economic factor 82 in the success of its operations.
Such benefits involve the maintenance of services and protection essential to
the production or marketing of goods, 83 the ownership of property or the
employment of personnel. 84
In conclusion, the nexus requirement, as a threshold precondition, affords
little limitation on the state's taxing power. The requirement that there be
"some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the
person, property or transaction it seeks to tax,"85 has been and will continue
to be broadly applied in a variety of taxing circumstances. 8
6
Fair Apportionment
Once the threshold nexus has been established the state or locality is
faced with the problem of how much of the taxpayer's revenue is to be
mail or common carrier, thereby exempting the taxpayer from the state's imposition of a use
tax).
81. American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. State Tax Commission. 238 Or. 340, 346, 395 P.2d
127, 130 (1964).
82. 238 Or. at 346, 395 P.2d at 130.
83. 238 Or. at 346, 395 P.2d at 130. The basic premise is that a taxpayer should have to pay
the services and protection that it has enjoyed.
84. E. Corrigan, Interstate Corporate Income Taxation-Recent Revolutions and a Modern
Response, 29 VAND. L. REV. 423, 428 (1976). In addition to active sales solicitation within a
state, any one of the following activities could subject an out-of-state seller to the jurisdiction of
the taxing state: the ownership of rental of any property; salespeoples' performance of minimal
services beyond solicitation; or the performance by an agent of the seller of consulting services
relative to the property sold to the in-state customer. Id. at 428. This indicates that virtually
any activity beyond the solicitation of orders defined in Pub. L. 86-272 confers taxing jurisdic-
tion upon the state in which the activity takes place. Id. at 429.
85. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
86. Substantial nexus, a jurisdictional question is, or should be no more mysterious a con-
cept than that applied in the various long arm statutes promulgated by most jurisdictions. The
concepts are stated in the same fashion and should be similarly applied in both the procedural
area and the state taxation field. See, e.g., Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975)
(excise tax on privilege of doing business upheld even if corporation was not incorporated within
state but owns property and is qualified to do business within the state); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,
362 U.S. 207, 211 (1960) (nexus upheld where foreign corporation used wholesalers as indepen-
dent contractors to solicit orders even though salesmen were not regular employees and were
not full time); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (maintenance of an
office not necessary in order to provide due process); General Trading Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944) (use tax duty of out-of-state seller to collect a state use tax upheld
where the foreign corporation maintained no state office but merely sent salespersons into state
to solicit orders filled by out-of-state headquarters); International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La.
279, 107 So.2d 640 (1959), cert. denied 359 U.S. 984 (1959) (tax upheld when activity involved
regular and systematic solicitation of orders by salespersons); Brown Forman Distillers Corp. v.
Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101 So.2d 70 (1958), cert. denied 359 U.S. 28 (1958), (nexus
upheld when the only activity was the presence of representatives to receive orders and promo-
tional representatives).
[Vol. 28:1
ASSN. OF WASHINGTON STEVEDORING COS.
levied upon without violating the Commerce Clause. It is a problem "of
identifying the constitutionally appropriate tax base." 8 7  Conflicting methods
of dividing the revenue of multistate corporations could result in the taxation
of more than 100% of the taxpayer's base, an oppressive burden substantially
exceeding that of the single state taxpayer. 88 However, diversity in state
and local tax apportionment which results in undertaxation of a multistate
enterprise is also unfair to the government and to competitive intrastate bus-
iness.8 9 The proper balance is "to furnish each State a fair share of the
corporation's tax payment." 90
Fair apportionment then, the second factor in the Washington Stevedoring
analysis, requires that the taxpayer be free from oppressive multiple taxa-
tion. Upon further analysis this can be delineated as: first, a fairly appor-
tioned levy is one which taxes the local aspects of interstate commerce even
though directly taxing the privilege to engage in interstate commerce, 9 1 or a
tax base divided by some method or formula attributing a proportional share
of the taxpayer's gross receipts to the taxing state, 92 and secondly, a fairly
87. The 1974 Term, supra note 15, at 168.
88. WILLIS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 157.
89. J. Hellerstein, State Taxation under the Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, 29
VAND. L. REV 335, 347 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Historical Perspective].
90. WILLIS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 158.
91. 98 S.Ct. at 1397 citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 288-89.
92. 98 S.Ct. at 1398. As a result of the multiple taxation doctrine, the Court will sanction
those levies which are reasonably designed to measure the state's nexus with the activities
taxed. STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, supra note 4, at 243. Justice Stone, in a case involving a
gross receipts tax on a publisher, stated that the tax could be supported "in the practical needs
of a taxing system which, under constitutional limitations, must accommodate itself to the dou-
ble demand that interstate business pay its way, and that at the same time it shall not be
burdened with cumulative exactions which are not similarly laid on local business. West-
ern Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 258 (1938).
When dealing with property, income and capital stock taxes, "the states have historically
relied on apportionment formulas to divide the tax base of an interstate enterprise equitably
among those jurisdictions having a legitimate claim to part of that base." The 1974 Term, supra
note 15, at 168. See also WILLIS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 113.
These formulas used to divide tax base among the States, particularly those used for gross
receipts taxes, have become a major source of controversy between the States and the multi-
state businesses. Historical Perspective, supra note 89, at 346. However, the Court has declined
to define permissible methods of dividing income or to resolve conflicting methods of appor-
tionment, "so long as each state's method, considered on its own merits, is not repugnant to the
Constitution." Id. at 347. In only three cases has the Court found a method or formula "repug-
nant" and these cases were decided on narrow grounds. Id. at 349. In 1931 in Hans Rees' Sons,
Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (1931), the Court set aside, as unconstitu-
tional, a state income tax apportionment made versus the manufacturer. However, "the Court
never again has invalidated a state tax apportionment of a corporate income tax, or a franchise
tax based on net income, of a manufacturer or mercantile company." Historical Perspective,
supra note 89, at 348. In Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Missouri St. Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S.
317 (1968), the Court concluded that the state had violated both the commerce and due process
clauses in applying the state's rail mileage apportionment method to the taxpayer's rolling stock
in the state. 390 U.S. at 323. In General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553
(1965), the Court invalidated the single factor sales receipts formula used by the District of
Columbia in determining the net income of General Motors attributable to the District. The
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apportioned tax can sustain a risk, a possibility of multiple burdens, but not
a multiple burden "in fact". 93
Fair Apportionment: Taxation of the Local
Aspects of Interstate Commerce
Historically, the Court was highly restrictive of the State's tax impositions
on interstate commerce. It was generally held that state taxation, in any
form, levied on interstate commerce, was an unconstitutional encroachment
upon federal authority. 94  This restrictive philosophy was modified as the
Court developed a "local incidents" test which allowed a local imposition if
the tax attached to the goods before they entered the stream of com-
merce. 95 However, a state imposition, even though totally local in applica-
tion, was considered unconstitutional if it directly affected interstate com-
merce; 96 those taxes which were held to have only an indirect effect on
interstate commerce were upheld.9 7 The view that interstate commerce was
activity free from direct taxation was repudiated by the multiple taxation
doctrine announced in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 98  In-
terstate enterprises were no longer considered immune from taxation merely
because they engaged in interstate commerce. Instead, a tax would be in-
valid "only if the Court though that [it] subjected interstate commerce to a
risk ... not borne by local commerce." 99
Company's sales receipts were established by its sales to local dealers, all of which had been
manufacturers outside the District. However, the Tax Comm'n. was authorized by statute to
prescribe only methods of apportionment that determined the "portion of the net income of the
corp . .. fairly attributable to .. .trade or business carried on .. .within the District." Id. at
554-55.
In sum, the Court is reluctant to interfere with the technical problems of administering a
complex apportionment system. Historical Perspective, supra note 89, at 348. To ensure that
the Court refrain from these technical tax mediations, it imposed a restrictive burden on the
taxpayer to be met in challenging the validity of an apportionment. The taxpayer must show an
actual burden resulting in multiple taxation. This burden precludes a taxpayer from asserting a
multiple taxation argument if the tax was apportioned by formula, as formulas are presumed to
be fairly apportioned. Only if the imposed tax were unapportioned could the taxpayer realistic-
ally assert the multiple taxation argument and then only if a "burden in fact" could be shown.
See notes 105-123 and accompanying text infra.
93. 98 S.Ct. at 1397 n.16 citing Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
462-63 (1959).
94. WILLIS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1038.
95. In American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919), the Court upheld a
gross sales tax imposed on manufactured goods on the grounds that the tax had only an "indi-
rect"effect on interstate commerce. id. at 464.
96. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 257-58 (1946).
97. Examples of such taxes would be ad valorem taxes, franchise taxes, net income taxes,
privilege or occupation taxes. See Note, Constitutional Law-State Taxation of Interstate
Commterce-Commuerce Clause Analysis, 76 W. VIRGINIA L. REv. 380, 383 (1974).
98. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
99. STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, supra note 4, at 243 citing Western Live Stock v. Bureau
of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
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Although the primary concern of this test was with the practical analysis of
arriving at an apportioned tax, rather than characterizing it as direct or indi-
rect, the Court did not, until Complete Auto, begin to eliminate this rather
nebulous distinction. Moreover, Complete Auto only implicitly considered
the classification of a direct tax, as distinguished from indirect tax, to be
irrelevant. 100 It was left to the Washington Stevedoring Court to explicitly
discard 101 the indirect-direct distinction:
"With the distinction between direct and indirect taxation of interstate
commerce thus discarded, the constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause of the application of the Washington business and occupation tax to
stevedoring depends upon the practical effect of the exaction. 10 2
The multiple taxation analysis entails the narrowing of what constitutes an
interstate transaction, a "natural result of measuring the interstate or local
character of the business or activities taxed by the yardstick of multiple taxa-
tion." 103 A gross receipts tax such as the Washington business and occupa-
tion tax, lacking a specific formula for apportionment, nevertheless will not
impose upon interstate commerce the risks of multiple taxation because by
definition the tax is applied only to the local aspects of the interstate activ-
ity.' 0 4 The Washington tax was considered fairly apportioned as it was im-
posed upon the value of the services performed within the state, even
though the activity of stevedoring was specifically characterized as interstate
commerce.
Fair Apportionment: Risks of Multiple Taxation
Originally, the mere risk or possibility that either a tax apportioned by
formula or an unapportioned tax would impose multiple burdens on
interstate commerce was sufficient to justify invalidation.'0 5 As originally
formulated the rule was framed in language indicating that capability was
sufficient to invalidate a tax whether or not multiple burdens actually were
imposed. 10 6  Even though a specific state tax alone would not be dis-
100. STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, supra note 4, at 287.
101. Such a rejection was anticipated in Freeman, Justice Rutledge felt that merely being a
"direct incidence" was "long since discarded as being itself sufficient to outlaw state legislation."
329 U.S. 249, 265-66 (1946). Instead a state tax is unconstitutional if the activity is subject to
multiple taxation. Id. at 276-77.
102. 98 S.Ct. at 1399.
103. STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, supra note 4, at 243.
104. 98 S.Ct. at 1397.
105. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 40 (1940); Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1938).
106. The 1974 Term, supra note 15, at 175 n.133. See also Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 663 (1948). The Court held that New York may constitutionally tax gross
receipts from transportation within the state but not outside the state because it unduly burdens
interstate commerce. The Court stated:
By its very nature an unapportioned gross receipts tax makes interstate transporta-
tion bear more than 'a fair share of the cost of the local government whose protec-
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criminatory, it would be invalidated because "other states also may have the
right constitutionally . . . to tax the same thing and either the actuality or
the risk of their doing so makes the total burden cumulative, discriminatory
or special."' 0 7  However, the Court shifted this position in Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,'08o by rejecting the risk of multi-
ple burdens concept on two grounds: 1) a tax must be actually shown to
burden interstate commerce in order to be invalidated and 2) a tax which is
fairly apportioned, by definition, cannot impose multiple burdens on in-
terstate commerce.
0 9
tion it enjoys' even if neither Pennsylvania nor New Jersey sought to tax their
proportionate share.
Id.
In Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422, 429 (1947), a New York city
excise tax levied on gross receipts of a stevedoring corporation engaged wholly within the ter-
ritorial limits of the city in loading and unloading vessels moving in interstate and foreign com-
merce was held to be an invalid burden on the Commerce Clause. The Court stated:
In the present case, the threat of a multiple burden . . . is absent. The multiple
burden on interstate transportation from taxation of the gross receipts from
stevedoring arises from the possibility of a similar tax for unloading.
Id.
In Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 440 (1939), a Washington tax
measured by the gross receipts of the taxpayer from his business of marketing fruit shipped
from the state to places of sale in other states and foreign countries was held to be a burden on
interstate commerce prohibited by the Commerce Clause. The Court stated:
Unlawfulness of the burden depends upon its nature, measured in terms of its
capacity to obstruct interstate commerce, and not on the contingency that some
other state may first have subjected the commerce to a like burden.
Id.
In J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938), the Court Stated:
The vice of the statute as applied to receipts from interstate sales is that the tax
includes in its measure, without apportionment, receipts derived from activities in
interstate commerce; and that the exaction is of such a character that if lawful it
may in substance be laid to the fullest extent by the states in which the goods are
sold as well as those in which they are manufactured.
Id.
107. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 358 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added) "Thus, the state may not impose certain taxes.on interstate commerce, its inci-
dents or instrumentalities, which are no more in amount or burden than it places on its local
business, not because this of itself is discriminatory, cumulative or special or would violate due
process, but because other states also may have the right constitutionally, apart from the com-
merce clause, to tax the same thing and either the actuality or the risk of their doing so makes
the total burden cumulative, discriminatory or special." Id.
108. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
109. The Northwestern Court stated that:
While the economic wisdom of state net income taxes is one of state policy not for
our decision, one of the 'realities' raised by the parties is the possibility of a multi-
ple burden resulting from the exactions in question. The answer is that none is
shown to exist here .... Logically it is impossible, when the tax is fairly appor-
tioned, to have the same income taxed twice. . . . We cannot deal in abstractions.
In this type of case the taxpayers must show that the formula places a burden upon
interstate commerce in a constitutional sense ....
358 U.S. 450, 462-63 (1959)
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Adherence to the actual burdens approach 110 was continued in Washington
Stevedoring,"' as the Court refused to decide on the alleged multiple taxa-
tion of the Washington gross receipts tax until it could be shown there was a
multiple burden in fact. 112  Exactly what the taxpayer must show to justify
multiple taxation remained unspecified. 1 13
In its latest position on the subject, however, the Court, in Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. Bair,14 has given some indication of what the taxpayer must
prove to substantiate a multiple burdens assertion. In that case, the appel-
lant taxpayer contended that both Illinois and Iowa imposed a tax on a por-
tion of its income derived solely from Iowa sales. 115  The Court found the
record lacking "the essential factual predicate for a claim of duplicative taxa-
tion." 116 Duplicative taxation, according to the Court, could have been es-
tablished if the taxpayer proved what portion of its net income was derived
from Iowa sales, as compared to sales from other states. 1 1 7  Once that por-
tion was computed, it could then be ascertained if "Illinois and Iowa to-
gether imposed a tax on more than 100% of the relevant net income." 118
However, since neither computation was made by the taxpayer, the exis-
tence of duplicative taxation was described by the Court as merely "specula-
tive." 119
Both the Washington Stevedoring and Moorman decisions are further in-
dication that fair apportionment is an issue which the Court will not
scrutinize very closely. 120  Risks of multiple taxation, no longer sufficient to
110. The Court continued to require that taxpayers prove up an actual burden of multiple
taxation in General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964). Dealing with the lack of
apportionment claim by declining to prorate the tax, the Court called its lack of apportionment
only "suspect," id. at 448, and refused to consider the multiple taxation claim since the Com-
pany had not shown a definite burden in fact. Id. at 449.
111. The Washington Stevedoring Court seemed to extent the "actual burdens" approach one
incredible step further: errors in apportionment that actually lead to multiple burdens in fact
will not necessarily be considered a per se violation of the Commerce Clause: for these errors
"may be corrected when they occur." 98 S.Ct. at 1397. This is consistent with the view that
apportionment is a technical problem best left to administrative adjustment and not to constitu-
tional adjudication.
112. 98 S.Ct. at 1497 n.16 citing Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
462-63 (1959).
113. The 1974 Term, supra note 15, at 176 n.133.
While invoking the notion of 'the risk of multiple taxation' as a criterion for evaluat-
ing the validity of a gross receipts tax under the multiple burden standard, the
Court nonetheless appears to be adhering to the Northwestern/General Motors ap-
proach in refusing to deal in abstractions and insisting that the taxpayer make a
palpable showing that the risk exists.
Id.
114. 98 S.Ct. 2340 (1978).





120. Historical Perspective, supra note 89, at 348.
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justify invalidation, are actually considered an inseparable "vice", 121 a hazard
of engaging in an interstate business.' 2 2 With the exception of flagrant
cases, 123 the Court apparently considers it beyond its constitutional province
to compare methods of dividing income between jurisdictions in order to
discover a "risk of multiple burdens", in the belief that an analysis basically
technical in nature is best left to the state tax administrators.
Non-Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce
The fourth factor of Washington Stevedoring, that of non-discrimination
against interstate commerce, has long been considered a Commerce Clause
restriction as well as forming the basis for an equal protection argument. A
tax is defined as discriminatory if it provides a "direct commercial advantage
to local business." 124
In applying this standard, the Court has struck down impositions that have
been either discriminatory on their face, in that they taxed out-of-state sell-
ers at higher rates than local sellers, 125 or those which were discriminatory
in effect, in that "their practical operation worked discriminatorily against
interstate commerce to impose upon it a burden, either in fact or by the
very threat of its incidence .... " 126
The discriminatory effect analysis is consistent with 127 the Court's "practi-
cal" focus underlying the other Commerce Clause factors.1 28 Such an
analysis is to be applied on a case by case basis, taking the entire scheme of
taxation into account.129 This involves a detailed financial comparison of the
121. The Court in Standard Pressed Steel noted that "in General Motors ... a vice in a tax
on gross receipts of a corporation doing an interstate business [was considered] the risk of
multiple taxation; but that the burden is on the taxpayer to demonstrate it .... The corpora-
tion made no such showing there. Nor is any effort made to establish it here. Standard Pressed
Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. at 563.
122. The Court considered the only conceivable constitutional basis for invalidating the Iowa
statute to be a Commerce Clause prohibition on any overlap in the computation of taxable
income by the States.
If the Constitution were read to mandate such precision in interstate taxation, the
consequences would extend far beyond this particular case. For some risk of du-
plicative taxation exists whenever the States in which a corporation does business do
not follow identical rules for the division of income.
Moorman v. Bair, 98 S.Ct. 2340, 2347.
123. See note 92 supra.
124. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959).
125. See, e.g., Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Nippert v.
Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
126. Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 425 (1946).
127. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reilly, 373 U.S. 64 (1963). The Court stated
that:
[t]his concern with the actuality of [the tax's] operation, a dominant theme running
through all state taxation cases, extends to every aspect of the tax operations.
Id. at 69.
128. See note 49-86 and accompanying text supra for the nexus analysis and notes 87-123 and
accompanying text supra for the apportionment analysis.
129. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reilly, 373 U.S. at 69.
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taxes' effect on out-of-state taxpayers engaged in the same activities as their
local counterparts. 130 If the comparison discloses either an actual dis-
criminatory effect or the mere risk of such an effect, the tax will be in viola-
tion of the Commerce Clause.131
The Court's willingness to involve itself in a detailed analysis involving the
discrimination factor while avoiding such detail involving apportionment 1 32
follows from the purpose of the Commerce Clause. 133 The Clause is not
merely a grant "to Congress to enact laws for the protection and encourage-
ment of Commerce among the states, .... " 134 but is also a limitation upon
the State's power, 135 a limitation intended to create an area of trade free
from interference by the States. 136
A state may enact a tax that, in fact, "burdens" the interstate enterprise,
as all taxation does, so long as such an imposition does not favor local enter-
prises at the expense of out-of-state enterprises. Such discriminatory treat-
ment would create "a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of
the free trade areas which the Clause protects." 137
Therefore, the discrimination factor will elicit a more strict scrutiny of a state
imposition than would the other Commerce Clause factors, precisely because
the risk of "preferential trade areas" analysis necessitates a detailed compari-
son of in-state and out-of-state taxpayers similarly situated within one juris-
diction, a manageable task, whereas a risk of "multiple tax burdens" analysis
involves the detailed comparison of tax impositions imposed upon one tax-
payer by many jurisdictions, a task which is frought with many technical
complexities.
THE IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE ANALYSIS
Resolution of the Commerce Clause issue was considered by the Court as
requiring an analysis distinct from the Import-Export Clause question. The
Commerce Clause, was considered a grant of power to Congress, involving
all state taxation of interstate and foreign commerce, whereas the Import-
Export Clause, a restriction upon power, was limited to only "Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports." 138 The dispositive issue then, according to
the Court, involved the meaning of the prohibition of "Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports." 139
130. Id. at 70. The Court stated that "[t]he conclusion is inescapable: equal treatment for
in-state and out-of-state taxpayers similarly situated is the condition precedent for a valid ....
[tax]". Id. at 70.
131. Id. at 72-73.
132. See notes 87-123 and accompanying text supra.
133. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n., 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977).
134. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951).
138. 98 S.Ct. at 1400 citing Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 279, 290-94 (1976)
and Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U.S. 69, 75 (1946).
139. Id.. at 1400.
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The stevedores contended that the Import-Export Clause absolutely pro-
hibits all taxation on imports and exports, a ban necessary in order to give it
meaning apart from the Commerce Clause.1 4 0  The Court however, citing
Michelin, rejected the Stevedores contention on two grounds. First the cen-
tral holding of Michelin involves "an absolute ban ... only of 'Imposts or
Duties' and not of all taxes." 141 Secondly, using a linguistic construction, the
Court felt that an interpretation of "Imposts and Duties" which would en-
compass all taxes would make some of the terms of Article I superfluous.
Since Article 1142 grants Congress the "power to lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises," the Court reasoned that the framers did not
include "excises," such as those on the privilege of doing business, within
the phrase "Imposts or Duties." 143
The Court also rejected the analysis that a tax is forbidden because it is
imposed on imports or exports 144 themselves or the process of importing or
exporting. Exclusive consideration of what constitutes an import or export, a
vague process at best, was abandoned in favor of the query of whether the
taxes are "Imposts or Duties" that "offend constitutional policies .... "145
As set forth in Michelin, a tax is to be considered constitutionally offen-
sive, if it violates any three of the policy considerations underlying the exis-
tence of the Clause: first, the federal government must have exclusive power
when regulating tariffs which may affect commercial relations with foreign
governments; secondly, duties from imports, a major source of revenue for
the federal government, should not be diverted by the states; third, har-
mony among the states should be preserved, a concern involving the possi-
bility that seaboard states, with their crucial ports of entry, could levy transit
taxes on goods merely flowing through their ports to other states. 146
Under this approach a tax which offends either of the first two policies is
suspect under the Import-Export Clause regardless of whether it disturbs
interstate harmony, in contrast to the Commerce Clause considerations
which effect neither of the first two policies. 147 The Washington tax, ac-
cording to the Court, offended neither of the three Import-Export policies.
First, the tax, held not to be a restrictive tariff, did not affect the ability of
the federal government to conduct foreign policy. The levy was imposed
only upon business conducted entirely within Washington. Neither a foreign
140. Id. at 1404.
141. Id.
142. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 1.
143. 98 S.Ct. at 1405.
144. The previous ban on import taxes used the "original package" doctrine of Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (1827), in which the goods enjoyed complete immunity from state
taxation so long as "the goods retained their status as imports by remaining in their import
packages. ... 98 S.Ct. at 1400. Exports were immune from state taxation once "the goods
had entered the 'export stream,' the final, continuous journey out of the country." 98 S.Ct. at
1400.
145. Id.. at 1404.
146. Id.. at 1401 quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1976).
147. Id.. at 1403.
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business nor vessel was taxed. Hence, the first Import-Export policy was
vindicated. 148 Second, the Washington tax was held to have no impact on
federal import revenues as it merely compensated the state for services and
protection extended to the stevedoring business. 149 Third, the Washington
Stevedoring Court further refined the Michelin policies by equating the third
import-export policy of preservation of interstate harmony with the "four
safeguards" of the Commerce Clause which were already shown to have
been vindicated. ' 50
The Court, also clarified two crucial issues not resolved by Michelin:
whether a tax relating to goods in transit would be an "Impost or Duty" and
whether the three policies should apply to taxation involving exports as well
as imports. 151 The fact that goods were in transit when the tax was imposed
was held not to transform that tax into an "Impost or Duty". As long as the
levy falls upon the service of stevedoring as distinct from the goods them-
selves, it will not be a prohibited "Impost or Duty." The Court was
careful to reserve for another day. 1 52 "the question of the applicability of
the Michelin approach when a State directly taxes imports or exports in
transit ... " 153
Moreover, Michelin was extended to exports as well as imports. So long as
the first and third policy interests are maintained, a tax related to exports
would not be considered an "Impost or Duty" any more than a tax related to
imports.15 4  Therefore the gross receipts from loading exports were held to
be equally and constitutionally subject to the Washington business and oc-
cupation tax as were the gross receipts from unloading imports.155
Although the Washington Stevedoring Court specifically equated the in-
terstate harmony requirement of the Import-Export Clause with the four
Commerce Clause factors,' 56 and specifically distinguished the first two
Import-Export Clause policies from any Commerce Clause consideration, 1 57
a further analysis of Michelin indicates that the underlying approach of the
148. Id. at 1401.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1401-02.
151. Id. at 1403.
152. See notes 160-63 and accompanying text infra for a rational solution to this problem.
153. The Court stated in a footnote:
We do not reach the question of the applicability of the Michelin approach when a
State directly taxes imports or exports in transit.
Our Brother Powell, as his concurring opinion indicates, obviously would prefer
to reach the issue today, even though the facts of the present case, as he agrees, do
not present a case of a tax on goods in transit. As in Michelin, decided less than
three years ago, we prefer to defer decision until a case with pertinent facts is
presented. At that time, with full argument, the issue with all its ramifications may
be decided.
98 S.Ct. at 1403 n. 23.
154. Id. at 1403.
155. Id. at 1404.




first two policy considerations has almost completely been merged with
those underlying the Commerce Clause.
Policy Consideration One:
Exclusive Power Regulating Tariffs
Exclusive power over foreign commerce would be violated if a tax created
special protective tariffs or preferences for certain domestic goods or was
applied selectively to "encourage or discourage importation." 158 This def-
inition from Michelin seems to indicate that only if the tax is imposed "di-
rectly" on the goods themselves will it be prohibited, a line of reasoning
which would resurrect, under the Import-Export Clause, the "direct-
indirect" test discarded under the Commerce Clause. 159 A focus on
whether the tax is imposed merely on services or handling of goods as dis-
tinct from the goods themselves, inevitably leads us back to a constitutional
construct devoid of economic significance. 1 60  For example, a state could
levy a so-called constitutionally appropriate "indirect" transit fee based upon
the volume of the stevedoring services, when, in fact, such tax is based upon
the volume of goods passing through the port. 6 '
Therefore, the fact that a levy is imposed on services, as was done in
Washington Stevedoring, as compared to the goods themselves, should have
no bearing on whether that levy would violate the Import-Export Clause
first policy consideration. Instead, the issue should turn upon whether such
levy was fairly related to the services and protection provided by the
state. 1 62  In other words, is the imposition simply making the imported
goods pay their own way, as analyzed under the Commerce Clause test, or
is the imposition merely exacting a transit fee for moving through the
state.163  It is difficult to imagine that such a fairly related tax could be
considered as impinging upon the federal government's exclusive power over
foreign commerce by creating special protective tariffs.
Policy Consideration Two:
Exclusive Right to All Revenues
From Imposts and Duties on Imports and Exports
A tax on imports will not, according to Michelin, deprive the federal
treasury of its entitled revenues unless it is a levy "on the commercial
privilege of bringing goods into [the] country ...",164 is based on the
158. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 286 (1976).
159. Id. at 286-87. See also notes 41-47 and accompanying text supra.
160. The Washington Stevedoring Court considered such a distinction to be "without
economic significance". 98 S.Ct. at 1403.
161. See 98 S.Ct. at 1405-06 (Powell, J., dissenting).
162. The fourth factor set forth in Washington Stevedoring's Commerce Clause analysis.
163. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. at 290.
164. Id. at 287.
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foreign origin of the imported goods, or is selectively imposed "so as sub-
stantially to impair or prohibit importation." 165
However, the Import-Export Clause does not prohibit a state from appor-
tioning "the cost of such services as police and fire protection among the
beneficiaries according to their respective wealth." 166 The crucial concepts
applied under this analysis, are in fact the fair apportionment and non-
discrimination concepts applied in the Commerce Clause analysis. The Court
in Michelin indicated that an importer should be able to bear his share of
the cost of state services just as would his competitors who handle only
domestic goods. 167 State taxation which results in an incidental diminution of
federal impost revenues by creating an additional economic burden on the
imported goods, is not prohibited under this policy consideration so long as
such taxes are uniform in application.
Prevention of these incidential effects were not even "remotely an objec-
tive of the Framers in enacting the prohibition." 168 If the taxes are
imposed in a non-discriminatory fashion and are fairly related to the services
provided to the importer, the second policy'consideration of the Import-
Export Clause will be vindicated, a vindication identical with the rationale
applied under the Commerce Clause analysis.
CONCLUSION
The Washington Stevedoring decision has accomplished a great deal in
dispelling confusion concerning the scope of constitutional limitations on the
state's power to tax interstate commerce. The Court has finally synthesized a
set of rational factors which can be consistently applied when testing this
power. Further analysis, however, indicates that these factors will provide
only the narrowest of limitations on state taxing power. The reasons are
two-fold. First, the factors themselves, though rational on their face, are
inherently vague in application in that they lack the technical precision
necessary to clearly inform the taxpayer of its liability. The real problem lies
not with the analysis developed but with the nature of the judicial decision
as a medium for solving an inherently technical problem. Secondly, given
the inevitably liberal interpretation of the factors applied in Washington
Stevedoring, it is almost assured that the Court will not, in the future, inter-
fere or intervene in what is, or should be, a matter for legislative resolution.
The Court has implicitly acknowledged that complex state taxation issues
ought to be resolved by expert tax administrators acting under legislative
guidance and not by the Court armed with the overbroad language of judi-
165. Id. at 288.
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cial decision. Confronting problems of a highly technical and complex nature
is perceived as beyond the Court's capability to resolve except in cases
where the tax imposition has flagrantly violated constitutional limits.
Anthony J. Ceravolo
